The usually insightful Chantal Hebert of the CBC political panel and the Toronto Sun writes on December 31 that the Liberals will never again govern until they understand that in today’s political alignments the NDP makes a Liberal majority impossible. The road to power for the Liberals goes through the offices of the NDP caucus. I made the same point over a month ago on this site. The road to power for the Liberals now runs through the NDP.

However Hebert’s mastery of politics is still less than complete when she says this means that the Liberals and the NDP must divy up the seats they contest in the next election, with each standing down for the other in seats that either could win. There are many things wrong about this suggestion. The first is that it fails to understand the fundamental nature of political parties in Canada. She needs to read Ken Carty’s excellent article entitled “The Politics of Tecumseh Corners: Canadian. Political Parties as Franchise Organizations”, published in the Canadian Journal of Political Science (35: 723-45). Carty correctly suggests that parties in Canada are founded on a kind of social contract whereby the central organization provides leaders, policy, campaign infrastructure and money, while the local organization provides workers, organization on the ground, election day vote pulling, and candidates. Fundamental to the whole structure is the understanding that local organizations differentiate themselves from then other parties and field candidates of their choosing. The idea that some might step aside and watch while another party has its way in the local constituency is completely foreign and deeply offensive to local activists. The central leaders will never have the power to make this happen except in a few exceptional circumstances. If you don’t understand this, you don’t understand Canadian politics. There are also other fundamental problems in dividing up seats, such as determining how many each party will have claim to. However this is secondary to the fundamental problem of inability to get the consent of local organizations, who enjoy a large amount of autonomy on the question of fielding a candidate and running local constituency elections.

hat is why the Coalition provided such an apparent break through in the thinking of the leaders of the progressive parties. It offered the only he only workable way for cooperation. It was audacious and for those steeped in conventional politics shocking. Hebert was no more able to appreciate its true significance and promise than any of the other elite commentators. They all piled on to discredit the arrangement because it was so radical in the Canadian context. It promised to be a game changer. But Hebert could not abide its sauciness any more than her more conservative journalist colleagues. To a person it offended their deeply conventional view of politics. It had the same affect on Ignatieff and the Martin wing of the Liberals. It threatened their understanding of power and control. They feared it as much as they didn’t understand it. And so it was not to be.

Tis a pity. Hebert is right about the need for reviving the underpinnings of the coalition if Canadians are to have competitive choices. But it cannot be done through shortcuts. A centralized union of the parties, which is what is involved in running only one candidate in winnable seats, can never be the first step. Such a union could come after a period of coalition, but it is premature to consider that. A conventional coalition is the necessary first step to any union of progressives. There is no other way of getting there. Opinion leaders on the left and the party leaders need to get their head around this. In particular, the Liberals need to understand it.

Unfortunately they cannot get back what they had in December 2008. That moment is gone. The Conservatives have consolidated and the NDP leadership was burned and has lost a any sense of trust it had. However the membership of the NDP is ready for a coalition. It is not ready for the Hebert solution. The golden moment that made a coalition possible last December is gone, and may not return again for sometime. But it will return in some form, and this time the leaders need to have the courage to do it. The media will whine. The immediate reaction of the majority of voters will be negative. Short term political reactions to a new political adventure are bound to be negative.

But if a coalition governs well that will dissipate. Future elections can proceed in keeping with party traditions under this scenario without party amalgamations at the local level. These may come in time if the experience is a good one, but it is not essential. But even without that it is easy to see regular progressive NDP-Liberal coalitions providing Canadians with government they like and embrace. That would not be a bad thing.

Chantal Hebert is smart. She has great insights into the Ottawa game. But she doesn’t understand Canadian parties. Which nis too bad. It would enrich public deliberation if intelligent journalists had the sagacity to help explain and educate on these questions As it is they simply add to the paralysis and paucity of vision in politics today.

A PMO e-mail claims that Liberal leader Michael Ignatieff flubbed it in a recent interview when asked why he wants to be Prime Minister. The PMO e-mail says “It was a lob question. Emmanuelle Latraverse (a Radio-Canada television journalist) asked Michael Ignatieff why he wants to be Prime Minister. An easy question for a man who wants the job so badly he tried to force an election in the middle of a recession – someone who returned from Harvard just so he could become Prime Minister.”

The PMO e-mail goes on to claim that Mr. Ignatieff couldn’t give a straight answer and that he stumbled and rambled. “He talked about everything and anything, except why he wants to become PM.” Which is true – he could not come up with anything but platitudes and rambling thoughts.

The Liberals have attacked the Conservatives for using government e-mail for such a partisan message. Which is a good point. But not the one that really matters to voters. The Conservatives are right. This should have been a gift question for a political leader of substance. Ignatieff should have been able with ease to respond with what he wants and hopes for Canada different from that offered by the Conservatives. That he could not do. The problem is that he comes to politics with one purpose only – to be Prime Minister. He has no compelling vision that drives him.

To make matters worse, in substance, he sees the world in almost exactly the same way that Harper does. He is unable to define an alternate direction for the country. Given that why should Canadians chose him?

This gets to the heart of the problem the Liberal face. There are a large number of Canadians who want the country to go in a different direction. Ignatieff neither understand nor embraces that view. People see that and are not impressed.

He has only one thing driving him – to be Prime Minister. That is not good enough. It undermines any argument for a change in leadership of the nation. Harper is doing quite a good job as a pro-business conservative. If Ignatieff offers no alternative to that, there is really no compelling reason to support him. Given the choice, most if not all of us will take the one who staked out that ground himself on his own. Harper actually has conviction driving him in that direction.

The Conservatives have hit upon the Liberals real achilles heel. As long as most people believe that Ignatieff has no other purpose then to occupy the office of Prime Minister, there is little reason for middle voters to support him. And he offers nothing to the progressive voters who will otherwise vote NDP.

Much has been said about Canada’s performance at Copenhagen, much of it negative. Many are disappointed that Canada did not take a stronger stand and provide greater leadership. Harper says it was a success and that the world followed Canada’s lead. However the government’s response has been seemingly halfhearted, seeming to confirm the critics’ view that the conference accomplished little and that Canada provided no leadership.

In terms of the substance of the negotiations, there are some reasons to support Harper’s claim. Before going he set out a number of goals for Canada in the international negotiations. First, Canada did not want a simple renewal of Kyoto. It insisted that Kyoto was a flawed deal, since it called for unrealistic reductions in carbon emissions, had no monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, and was ignored by most countries. Second, Canada insisted that all major countries must be part of a deal, refusing to participate if the emerging industrial nations are not part of any deal. While the industrial countries currently contribute about 75% of the missions, he maintained that will change rapidly as Brazil, China, India and other emerging powers grow rapidly over the next few years. Third, Canada insisted that commitments must be “realistic” and achievable. Harper was not prepared to take part in a deal that was bound to fail because it does not include plans for implementation that will be followed. Fourth, Harper insists that Canada must follow the United States and its commitments, given the close integration of the Us and Canadian economies. To do otherwise he insists would put Canada’s economy at a large disadvantage and would not be sustainable.

On the first three points he certainly has a point. Kyoto was a failure. Canada is perhaps the best example of how ineffective Kyoto was. After making ambitious commitments, Canada proceeded to do very little. No progress was made on reducing emissions. In this respect it was little different from many countries, although to be fair European and Nordic countries showed real progress. However in abandoning Kyoto Canada (and the United States who took the same position) relieve themselves of having to make up for their failures to implement it, conisderably reducing any obligations they will have. On the second and third points, Harper’s views also are credible. If any deal is not broad, inclusive and binding and certain to he honoured, it is hard to see the point. As Harper’s press secretary stated, the global warming crisis is serious and the international effort must be more than just a political game played out for its optics.

Some hard questions remain about Canada’s claims coming out of Copenhagen however. One is the claim that the conference was a success. As many critics have stated, so far we have no more than an agreement on principles and targets. A binding agreement must still be hammered out. This is much less than many had hoped for. However, it is not likely that Canada played much of a role in this outcome. Rather, the complexity of the issues and the negotiations, and the highly complex strategies of the major players, made a hard agreement impossible. The need to proceed in steps toward a hoped for concrete agreement reflects the realities of the situation rather than any leadership by Canada.

The second and more important question is whether Canada should have acted as a leader or follower in setting directions and content of climate policies. Harper says we must follow the United States. That is in many ways what informed Harper’s positions. Others including the opposition party leaders and the Premiers of Ontario and Quebec say this is as abrogation of Canada’s responsibilities both domestically and internationally. This is a credible criticism. There is a real danger that Canada’s interests could be subverted by those of the US if we just blindly follow. There is also a danger that Canada will fail to address problems of regional equity and efficiency if it simply follows the US model.

However the idea that Canada can or should devise broad policy instruments and outcomes sufficiently different from the US is not all that credible. Harper is right in saying that Canada must operate on a generally level playing field with the US. To do otherwise would impose huge costs on Canada with few corresponding benefits. To work Canada’s approach must be an integral part of a larger North American effort. It is a stretch to argue that Canada can or should come up with something that takes us in a different direction from that of the US. And of course as a Conservative leader supported by many business and core right wing voters deeply skeptical about global warming, it is not surprise that Harper sees no virtue in exceeding the US effort.

The real concerns coming out of Copenhagen are threefold. One is the question of whether the US can find a way to commit to a major effort. The majority in Congress seem unlikely to take bold action. If the US flags, the world wide effort will be minor in scale. The next few months are needed to move the weight of opinion there. In that sense a delay is not a bad thing.

Second, Canada must sort out its internal problems. As the Premiers of Quebec and Ontario have pointed out, domestic policy will determine how the burden of any carbon reductions are to be distributed by region and industry. Charest and Migiunty fear that the relatively lower per capita carbon contributions of their provinces will be used to relieve demands on other regions to take substantive action. The most controversial question here is whether carbon dirty heavy oil production in Alberta will be given a break simply because other industries which are doing much better. The Premier of Alberta expressed great anger at these two Premiers over their positioning in the issue just prior to Christmas, giving credence to this argument.

This may very well be the biggest failure on Harper’s part to date. A break for the oil sands at the expense of much cleaner industries in central Canada could make Trudeau’s national energy policy look like a minor irritant. Delay in working out the internal framework for Canada’s policy within Canada could very well be the prelude to a much larger national conflict pitting Central Canada against the West. Harper must find a way to diffuse that. Otherwise Canada could be in paralysis when the time comes to act with the rest of the world. It is still likely that the US and the rest of the world will follow Copenhagen with negotiations leading to a deal later this year. Canada needs to get its act together in the interim.

The third concern is the affect delay has in providing the ground rules of industries to make investments in carbon reductions. If 2020 goals are to be met, each year of delay imposes larger annual reductions than would otherwise be the case. It is critical that Canada act on the assumption that a binding deal will come in 2010, that that it start providing a framework for action for key industrial sectors. There is a desperate need for basic ground rules now. This more that the outcome of Copenhagen puts real pressure on Canada to get a policy framework in place on the expectation that an international accord is coming soon.