It is a terrible and depressing day, this last day of 2009 and the first decade of the new millenium. The death of four Canadian soldiers and a journalist in Afghanistan yesterday is just starting to sink in as we in Canada mull the news over our end of year morning coffee.

There are a number of reactions that one picks up from both informal and published sources. Some triumph the view that this is final proof that the whole effort was and is wrong headed, and it would never had happened had governments listened. Others express regret, but say that death is a risk that goes with war, and that nothing significant can be read into this from a policy point of view. Others are confused and frustrated that we cannot protect our own and demand that our military leaders do a better job of command. Even others understandably feel simple grief and sadness at the loss of the lives of young men and women who could be our own sons and daughters, simply doing their best to make a contribution to building a better world.

All of these reactions are understandable. None of them are wrong. War is horrible and deaths are inevitable. It is impossibly sad to hear the stories of the 138 young people killed there and not be reduced to tears. As I write this I listen to a Calgary Herald reporter recalling the life and work of Michelle Lang, the young reporter killed yesterday along with the four soldiers. I am a little surprised that I am feeling sadness verging on tears. But in the end all young deaths are personal, painful, and tragic. It is hard not to feel those things at times like this.

Lives lost should be for a reason. The military effort in Afghanistan, it is becoming clear, has failed. The conventional idea that insurgents can be defeated through hit and run forays from safe bases has proved wrong. This strategy that prevailed for so long in fighting the Taliban, has failed. They cannot be defeated this way. They are too mobile and too elusive to fight against successfully in this large and hostile physical environment. They know the country and the people, they are brave and committed to a cause, and they enjoy the advantage of anticipation and initiative. The Canadian forces are in many ways in a situation similar to that of the US cavalry chasing the Indians of the US northwest in the 19th century. In the end it was white settlement, displacement and the extension of civil authority, not killing, that prevailed. Some truths prevail across time.

There has been a recognition of this reality, up to a point, but the Canadian military over the past few months. A new strategy has been adopted focusing on securing local communities and settlements. This has become known as the Dan Valley strategy, named after the area adjacent to Kandahar where this strategy is being applied. The idea is that rather than madly chasing after Taliban fighters in the remote mountains and valley hideouts, the soldiers will work to secure and protect local communities, train local soldiers and police to provide local and regional security, develop local services, businesses and government institutions.

Which brings us to the most significant thing about yesterday’s deaths. These soldiers were killed in this very Dan Valley, in a regular and assumed safe patrol. The attack occurred in the very location where the much trumpeted new community security strategy is being pursued. It is the centre piece of what NATO says is to be a new model, replacing the old hot pursuit strategy. We can now see the Taliban can and will penetrate these so-called safe haven communities at will. They have the means and the will to take the war to the western forces wherever they maybe.

The reality is that things have changed radically in Afghanistan as this decade has evolved. When western forces initially went into Afghanistan, something over 80% of the population of the country supported the action. The promises of peace, security, development, governance, and civil society was understood and supported by the nation. The truth is that eight years have been essentially wasted. The seminal development was the American abandonment of its commitment there in pursuit of its quixotic adventure in Iraq. When money, forces and development effort shifted dramatically to Iraq, Afghanistan paid dearly. Development stopped, government turned corrupt and al Qaeda and the Taliban immediately saw that Afghanistan was now open to them in a way that seemed impossible up to that point. Their expectations altered dramatically. They saw immediately that Afghanistan was now much easier and much more likely of succeeding for them.

The Taliban have used the years since the Iraq invasion to great advantage. They have focused on stalemating the western forces in the south, undermining the confidence of Afghanis in the western determination to prevail, communications and propaganda (in which they have been absolutely masterful in the use of electronic non-broadcast media), and on undermining the Karzai regime The west became almost totally reactive and defensive. Effective development came to a virtual halt. Billions of dollars were spent on security for western aid and military support workers at the expense of infrastructure creation and industrial development. A sad example is that Canada has trumpeted the building of a new hydro electric and irrigation dam in the south, hundreds of millions have been spent, and extravagant promises made. The now dam sits unused, producing no electricity and irrigating no crops. Nothing is now said about this legacy project. More generally, housing, water and sewer, electricity, social services and jobs all have taken a back seat. All of these have been in fact admissions of defeat, and the people of Afghanistan and the Taleban have not missed that point.

The truth is that the Afghan effort has failed. The promise of the early years of the decade cannot be recaptured. But governments cannot admit to this. The politics of doing so in the US, Canada and the UK are deadly. Obama, Brown and Harper are reduced to fighting a war that cannot be won, defending a country that has failed to develop a workable government, and attempting to convince a now skeptical and in many cases hostile population that is in various ways now positioning for the day when the west leaves.