Much has been said about Canada’s performance at Copenhagen, much of it negative. Many are disappointed that Canada did not take a stronger stand and provide greater leadership. Harper says it was a success and that the world followed Canada’s lead. However the government’s response has been seemingly halfhearted, seeming to confirm the critics’ view that the conference accomplished little and that Canada provided no leadership.

In terms of the substance of the negotiations, there are some reasons to support Harper’s claim. Before going he set out a number of goals for Canada in the international negotiations. First, Canada did not want a simple renewal of Kyoto. It insisted that Kyoto was a flawed deal, since it called for unrealistic reductions in carbon emissions, had no monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, and was ignored by most countries. Second, Canada insisted that all major countries must be part of a deal, refusing to participate if the emerging industrial nations are not part of any deal. While the industrial countries currently contribute about 75% of the missions, he maintained that will change rapidly as Brazil, China, India and other emerging powers grow rapidly over the next few years. Third, Canada insisted that commitments must be “realistic” and achievable. Harper was not prepared to take part in a deal that was bound to fail because it does not include plans for implementation that will be followed. Fourth, Harper insists that Canada must follow the United States and its commitments, given the close integration of the Us and Canadian economies. To do otherwise he insists would put Canada’s economy at a large disadvantage and would not be sustainable.

On the first three points he certainly has a point. Kyoto was a failure. Canada is perhaps the best example of how ineffective Kyoto was. After making ambitious commitments, Canada proceeded to do very little. No progress was made on reducing emissions. In this respect it was little different from many countries, although to be fair European and Nordic countries showed real progress. However in abandoning Kyoto Canada (and the United States who took the same position) relieve themselves of having to make up for their failures to implement it, conisderably reducing any obligations they will have. On the second and third points, Harper’s views also are credible. If any deal is not broad, inclusive and binding and certain to he honoured, it is hard to see the point. As Harper’s press secretary stated, the global warming crisis is serious and the international effort must be more than just a political game played out for its optics.

Some hard questions remain about Canada’s claims coming out of Copenhagen however. One is the claim that the conference was a success. As many critics have stated, so far we have no more than an agreement on principles and targets. A binding agreement must still be hammered out. This is much less than many had hoped for. However, it is not likely that Canada played much of a role in this outcome. Rather, the complexity of the issues and the negotiations, and the highly complex strategies of the major players, made a hard agreement impossible. The need to proceed in steps toward a hoped for concrete agreement reflects the realities of the situation rather than any leadership by Canada.

The second and more important question is whether Canada should have acted as a leader or follower in setting directions and content of climate policies. Harper says we must follow the United States. That is in many ways what informed Harper’s positions. Others including the opposition party leaders and the Premiers of Ontario and Quebec say this is as abrogation of Canada’s responsibilities both domestically and internationally. This is a credible criticism. There is a real danger that Canada’s interests could be subverted by those of the US if we just blindly follow. There is also a danger that Canada will fail to address problems of regional equity and efficiency if it simply follows the US model.

However the idea that Canada can or should devise broad policy instruments and outcomes sufficiently different from the US is not all that credible. Harper is right in saying that Canada must operate on a generally level playing field with the US. To do otherwise would impose huge costs on Canada with few corresponding benefits. To work Canada’s approach must be an integral part of a larger North American effort. It is a stretch to argue that Canada can or should come up with something that takes us in a different direction from that of the US. And of course as a Conservative leader supported by many business and core right wing voters deeply skeptical about global warming, it is not surprise that Harper sees no virtue in exceeding the US effort.

The real concerns coming out of Copenhagen are threefold. One is the question of whether the US can find a way to commit to a major effort. The majority in Congress seem unlikely to take bold action. If the US flags, the world wide effort will be minor in scale. The next few months are needed to move the weight of opinion there. In that sense a delay is not a bad thing.

Second, Canada must sort out its internal problems. As the Premiers of Quebec and Ontario have pointed out, domestic policy will determine how the burden of any carbon reductions are to be distributed by region and industry. Charest and Migiunty fear that the relatively lower per capita carbon contributions of their provinces will be used to relieve demands on other regions to take substantive action. The most controversial question here is whether carbon dirty heavy oil production in Alberta will be given a break simply because other industries which are doing much better. The Premier of Alberta expressed great anger at these two Premiers over their positioning in the issue just prior to Christmas, giving credence to this argument.

This may very well be the biggest failure on Harper’s part to date. A break for the oil sands at the expense of much cleaner industries in central Canada could make Trudeau’s national energy policy look like a minor irritant. Delay in working out the internal framework for Canada’s policy within Canada could very well be the prelude to a much larger national conflict pitting Central Canada against the West. Harper must find a way to diffuse that. Otherwise Canada could be in paralysis when the time comes to act with the rest of the world. It is still likely that the US and the rest of the world will follow Copenhagen with negotiations leading to a deal later this year. Canada needs to get its act together in the interim.

The third concern is the affect delay has in providing the ground rules of industries to make investments in carbon reductions. If 2020 goals are to be met, each year of delay imposes larger annual reductions than would otherwise be the case. It is critical that Canada act on the assumption that a binding deal will come in 2010, that that it start providing a framework for action for key industrial sectors. There is a desperate need for basic ground rules now. This more that the outcome of Copenhagen puts real pressure on Canada to get a policy framework in place on the expectation that an international accord is coming soon.